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1.1 Introduction
Femtocell base stations (FBSs), also known as Home eNodeBs (HeNBs), are short-range
low-power and low-cost base stations with third party backhaul (e.g., DSL or cable mo-
dem). They are usually deployed and controlled by end-users who desire better indoor
signal transmission and reception. With the help of such FBSs, the network operator is able
to extend the high quality coverage inside peoples’ homes without the need of additional
expensive cellular towers. At the same time, FBSs oﬄoad traffic from the overlay macrocell
network and subsequently improve the overall network capacity. Nevertheless, despite FBSs
promise, many concerns still remain, especially cross-tier interference. Two particular as-
pects of FBSs give rise to serious interference issues: (a) the co-channel spectrum sharing
between femtocells and macrocells as well as among femtocells, (b) the ”random” location
of user-installed FBSs (they can be deployed anywhere inside the macrocell area with no-
prior warning). First, unlike Wi-Fi access points, FBSs serve users in licensed spectrum,
to guarantee Quality-of-Service (QoS). Moreover, instead of allocating dedicated licensed
channels to FBSs, sharing the spectrum is preferable from an operator’s perspective (higher
spectral efficiency). Secondly, FBSs are installed by end-users in a ”plug-and-play” manner,
which translates into ”randomness” in their locations. For these two reasons, interference in
two-tier networks is quite different than in conventional cellular networks, which endangers
their successful co-existence. A typical scenario is the ”Dead Zone” or ”Loud Neighbor”
problem, where mobile users transmit and receive signals at positions near FBSs but far
from the macrocell BSs, causing significant macro-to-femto interference in the uplink. In
the downlink, these users likewise suffer from low signal to interference ratios (SIRs) be-
cause of the strong interference from the FBSs. These affects are akin to the well known
near-far problem, but exacerbated by the de-centralization and lack of coordinated power
control inherent in two-tier networks. In addition, because of the non-existent coordination
between FBSs and macrocell BSs, centralized cooperation to mitigate cross-tier interfer-
ence is deemed infeasible, hence two-tier networks need to adopt decentralized strategies for
interference management.
Game Theory (GT) is a mathematical tool that analyzes interactions among decision
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makers. GT is seen as a natural paradigm to study and analyze wireless networks where
players compete for the same resources. The importance of studying the coexistence between
macro- and femtocells from a game theoretical perspective is multi-fold: First, by model-
ing the dynamic spectrum sharing among network players (MBSs, FBSs, MUEs, FUEs) as
games, the behaviours and actions of players can be analyzed in a formalized structure, by
which the theoretical achievements in GT can be fully utilized. Second, GT equips us with
various optimality criteria for the spectrum sharing problem, which are of key importance
when it comes to analyzing the equilibria of the game. Third, the application of GT enables
us to derive efficient distributed algorithms for self-organized networks relying only on partial
information. In order to achieve this, the theory of learning in games is of high importance
allowing players to choose the right strategies and gradually learn from their environment
through trials and errors until convergence. The expected contribution is this chapter is as
follows:
In the first section of the chapter, we show that the deployment of femtocell networks
is cast into a dynamic spectrum sharing problem with different interference scenarios such
as femtocell-to-femtocell and femtocell-to-macrocell interference. Femto base stations and
their associated femtocell user equipments (FUEs) need to to autonomously determine their
transmission strategies in order to maximize their own performance metrics. Often, this con-
figuration is described by the power allocation scheme, channel/carrier selection, modulation
scheme, etc. However, the transmission configuration of one femto-base station affects the
performance of other FBS and all their associated FUEs. Hence, this scenario is clearly a
competition of selfish autonomous devices for radio resources. Under these conditions, GT
appears as one of the paradigms to study these types of networks. Finally, in this section,
we provide the fundamental concepts of game theory required to understand the results
presented in the rest of this chapter.
The second section tackles one of the most important issues in self organized networks,
namely learning. Due to their non-coordinated nature, femtocells opportunistically share the
spectrum with the macrocell network while mitigating their interference towards among oth-
ers. In order to do so, femtocells need to self-organize and optimize their strategies/actions
(power level, carrier allocation etc) taking into account their side information. Learning
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is an inherent part of self-organization paradigms and is crucial for developing and adapt-
ing multi-agent strategies based on their perceived reward. The problem boils down as to
how femtocells gradually learn from their environment (through trials-and-errors) while at
the same time not interfering with the overlay macrocell network. Furthermore, learning is
adamantly driven by the type of information available at every agent where the possibility
of exchanging their local information drives the learning efficiency (and convergence) and
thereby their respective payoffs. For this purpose, we will investigate both private and public
information exchange among femtocells.
The third section looks into the QoS provisioning of femtocell networks, in which fem-
tocells mitigate their interference towards the overlay macrocell network. Tools from game
theory and Stochastic geometry are used to come up with decentralized algorithms to achieve
the equilibrium of the game.
The fourth section investigates the spectral efficiency of femtocell networks using the
framework of potential games. Here, typical problems such as power allocation and channel
selection are tackled in detail. We put in evidence the existence of the following paradoxes
(observable only in decentralized networks): In a multi-carrier system, increasing the number
of channels each device can use highly reduces the global performance of the system. Hence,
it is more beneficial for a given network to constraint the devices to use a single channel
rather than allowing them to simultaneously use several channels. Finally, we discuss sev-
eral decentralized algorithms which allow self-configuring femtocell networks to achieve the
equilibrium.
1.2 System Model
Consider a set of M = {1, . . . ,M} macrocell base stations (MBS) each one operating over
an exclusive fixed frequency band and serving their respective macrocell user equipments
(MUEs) following a time division multiple access (TDMA) policy. At each time interval,
each MBS serves one of its corresponding MUE aiming to guaranteing a minimum time-
average signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) over their communication duration.
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We assume that there exists a set N = {1, . . . , N} of N frequency bands over which MBS
can operate. Let Γ
(m)
0 , m ∈ M, denote the minimum time-average SINR offered by MBS
m over its corresponding fixed frequency band. Consider now a set K = {1, . . . , K} of K
femtocells underlaying the M-cell N -frequency band macrocell system. Each femtocell can
use any of the available frequency bands to serve its corresponding femto end-users (FUE)
as long as it does not induce a lower time-average SINR than the minimum required by the
MUE, i.e., Γ
(1)
0 , . . . ,Γ
(M)
0 . At each time interval each FBS serves one FUE over one of the
available channels following a TDMA policy.
Let t ∈ {1, . . . ,∞} be a discrete time index. For all (j, k,m) ∈ M2 × N , h(n)1,j,k repre-
sents the channel realization between MBS k and MUE j over channel m at time t. For all
(j, k,m) ∈ K×M×N , h(n)2,j,k represents the channel realization between MBS k and FUE j
over channel n at time t. For all (j, k,m) ∈M×K×N , h(n)3,j,k represents the channel realiza-
tion between FBS k and MUE j over channel n at time t. Finally, for all (j, k,m) ∈ K2×N ,
h
(n)
4,j,k represents the channel realization between FBS k and FUE j over channel n at time t.
Denote by h(t) the vector of all channel realizations at time t. All channel realizations, i.e.,
each component of h(t), are independent and identically distributed following a probability
distribution which is a parameter of the network. Let the finite set denoted by H be the
set of all possible vectors h(t), for all t > 0. Finally, channel realizations at time t are
independent of those at time t− 1, for all t > 0.
Let pk,max and p0,m, with k ∈ K and m ∈M, be the maximum transmit power of FBS k and
MBSm, respectively. For all k ∈ K, let theN -dimensional vector pk(t) =
(
p
(1)
k (t), ..., p
(N)
k (t)
)
denote the power allocation vector of FBS k ∈ K at time t. Here p(n)k (t) is the transmit power
of femtocell k over frequency band n at time t. In the channel selection problem, all FBSs
are assumed to transmit only over one frequency band at each time t at a given power level
not exceeding pk,max. Let Lk be the number of power levels of FBS k, i.e.,
pk,max
Lk
, . . . , pk,max.
For all (k, ℓ, s) ∈ K × {1, . . . , LK} × N , denote by the N -dimensional vector
q
(ℓ,n)
k =
ℓ
L
pk,maxe
(N)
n , (1.1)
the power allocation (PA) vector when FBS transmits over channel n at power level ℓ. Denote
6CHAPTER 1. GAME THEORY AND FEMTOCELL COMMUNICATIONS: MAKING NETWORK
also by q
(0,0)
k , with k ∈ K, the N -dimensional null vector, i.e., q
(0,0) = (0, . . . , 0). Thus, FBS
k has Nk = Lk · S + 1 possible PA vectors, q(0,0), q
(1,1)
k , . . . , q
(Lk,N)
k .
For all (k, n) ∈ K ×N , let γ(n)k be the SINR of FUE k at time t and for all m ∈ M, let
γ
(nm)
0,m be the SINR of the MUE in the macrocell m at time t. Let also the setMn ⊂ K, with
n ∈ N , be the set of MBS using channel n. Then, we can write that
γ
(n)
k
(t)=
p
(n)
k
(t)
∣∣∣h(n)4,k,k(t)∣∣∣2
σ
(n)2
k
+
∑
m∈Mn
p0,m|h(n)2,k,m(t)|
2
+
∑
j∈K\{k}
p
(n)
j
(t)|h(n)4,k,j (t)|
2
(1.2)
and for all m ∈ M,
γ
(nm)
0,m (t)=
p0,m
∣∣∣h(nm)1,m,m(t)∣∣∣2
σ20,m+
∑
j∈Mnm\{m}
p0,j|h(nm)1,m,j (t)|
2
+
∑
i∈K\{k}
pi,max|h(nm)3,m,i(t)|
2
, (1.3)
where for all m ∈ M, nm is the channel used by MBS m and σ
(nm)
0,m
2
and σ
(nm)
k
2
is the noise
power over MUE m and the noise power over FUE k on the frequency band n.
All FBSs are interested in optimizing a given interference mitigation metric denoted by
u : RN ·K+M → R, which determines at each instant t the impact of the interference on
the macro system based on the observation of all the SINR levels γ
(n)
k and γ
(nm)
0,m , with
(k, n) ∈ K ×N and m ∈M.
In the case of multiple access channels (MACs), femtocell base stations communicate
with a single receiver using a common channel. This case can happen when femto user
equipments compete for the same resources in the uplink, or when FBSs compete for backhaul
resources. We assume that there exists a set N = {1, ..., N} of N frequency bands over which
transmitters operate. If N > 1 channels are available, then there exists N independent or
parallel MACs, where transmitters in different MACs do not interfere each other. Moreover,
the channel gain from transmitter k ∈ K to the receiver over channel n ∈ N is denoted by
h
(n)
k . We assume a block flat-fading channel model such that channel realizations remain
constant during the transmission of M consecutive symbols. All the channel realizations,
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∀k ∈ K and ∀n ∈ N are drawn from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
variance. The power allocated by transmitter k to channel n is denoted by p
(n)
k . Each
transmitter is power-limited wherein for the ith transmitter, its transmit power cannot exceed
pk,max, i.e., ∀k ∈ K,
∑N
n=1 p
(n)
k ≤ pk,max. The received SINR on channel n for transmitter k,
denoted by γ
(n)
k for all ∀(k, n) ∈ K ×N is:
γ
(n)
k =
p
(n)
k |h
(n)
k |
2∑K
j 6=k p
(n)
j |h
(n)
j |
2 + σ2
(1.4)
1.3 Game Theory and Self-Organized Femtocell Networks
In the following, we introduce basic concepts and definitions of game theory which will be
used throughout the chapter.
1.3.1 Strategic-Form Games
The spectrum sharing between the macro and femtocells can be respectively modeled by the
following two non-cooperative static games in strategic form (with i ∈ {a, b}):
G(i) =
(
K,
(
P(i)k
)
k∈K
, (uk)k∈K
)
. (1.5)
Let K be the set of players (i.e., FBSs). An action of a given FBS k ∈ K is a particular
power allocation (PA) scheme, i.e., an N -dimensional PA vector pk =
(
p
(1)
k , . . . , p
(N)
k
)
∈ P(i)k ,
where P(i)k is the set of all possible PA vectors which FBS k can use either in the game G(a)
(i = a) or in the game G(b) (i = b). An action profile of the game i ∈ {a, b} is a super vector
p = (p1, . . . ,pK) ∈ P
(i),
where P(i) is a set obtained from the Cartesian product of the action sets P(i)k , for all k ∈ K,
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i.e., P(i) = P(i)1 × . . .× P
(i)
K , where,
P(a)k =
{(
p
(1)
k , . . . p
(N)
k
)
∈ RN : ∀n ∈ N , p(n)k > 0, (1.6)
and
∑
n∈N
p
(n)
k 6 pk,max}, and
P(b)k =
{
pk,max en : ∀n ∈ N , en =
(
e(1)n , . . . , e
(N)
n
)
(1.7)
and ∀r ∈ N \ n, en(r) = 0, and e
(n)
n = 1
}
.
In this chapter, we respectively refer to the games G(a) and G(b) as the PA game and CS
game. Let us denote by p−k any vector in the set
P(i)−k
△
= P(i)1 × . . .× P
(i)
k−1 × P
(i)
k+1 × . . .× P
(i)
K (1.8)
with (i, k) ∈ {a, b} × K. For a given k ∈ K, the vector denoted by p−k represents the
strategies adopted by all the players other than player k. With a slight abuse of notation, we
write any vector p ∈ P(i), with i ∈ {a, b}, as
(
pk,p−k
)
, in order to emphasize the k-th vector
component of the super vector p. The utility for player k in the game G(i) is its spectral
efficiency uk : P(i) → R+, with i ∈ {a, b} and
uk(pk,p−k) =
∑
n∈N
Bn
B
log2
(
1 + γ
(n)
k
)
[bps/Hz] (1.9)
where γ
(n)
k is the SINR of Femto base station k over channel n.
1.3.2 Potential Games
Potential games (PG) [38] are a class of games for which existence of pure NE is guaranteed.
Definition 1 (Exact Potential Game) Any game in strategic form defined by the 3-tuple(
K, (Pk)k∈K , (uk)k∈K
)
is an exact potential game if there exists a function φ (p) for all p ∈ P
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such that for all players k ∈ K and for all p′k ∈ Pk, it holds that
uk(pk,p−k)− uk(p
′
k,p−k) = φ(pk,p−k)− φ(p
′
k,p−k).
Definition 2 (Exact Constrained Potential Game) Any game in normal form defined
by the 4-tuple
(
K, {Pk}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
is an exact constrained potential game (PG)
if there exists a function φ (s) for all p ∈ PSE such that for all players k ∈ K and for any
pair of actions (pk,p
′
k) ∈
{
fk
(
p−k
)}2
, it holds that
ck(pk,p−k)− ck(p
′
k,p−k) = φ(pk,p−k)− φ(p
′
k,p−k).
Using the spectral efficiency utility function (1.9), the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 The strategic games G(i), with i ∈ {a, b}, are exact potential games with
potential function
φ(p) =
∑
n∈N
Bn
B
log2
(
σ2n +
K∑
k=1
p
(n)
k g
(n)
k
)
. (1.10)
In fact, the games G(i), i ∈ {a, b} are not only potential games but also best-response potential
games [40]. A BRPG is a PG which verifies:
arg max
qk∈P
(i)
k
uk
(
qk,p−k
)
= arg max
qk∈P
(i)
k
φ
(
qk,p−k
)
. (1.11)
Indeed, the utility function (1.9) can be written in terms of the potential function (1.10) as
follows
∀k ∈ K, uk
(
pk,p−k
)
= φ
(
pk,p−k
)
− υk
(
p−k
)
,
where
υk
(
p−k
)
=
∑
n∈N
Bn
B
log2
σ2n + ∑
j∈K\{k}
p
(n)
j g
(n)
j
 ,
and by inspection, it becomes clear that both G(a) and G(b) satisfy the condition (1.11).
In other words, condition (1.11) shows that the individual utility maximization problem is
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equivalent to maximizing a common function.
1.3.3 The Concept of Equilibrium
Our interest is to find a strategy profile p such that no player is interested in changing its own
strategy. Once the network configuration p∗ is reached, any unilateral deviation of a given
player decreases its own utility. A network configuration p∗ is known as a Nash equilibrium
[19].
The Nash equilibrium (NE) is an important concept in the field of game theory wherein
an N.E corresponds to a profile of strategies p∗ = (p∗1, ..., p
∗
K) for which each player’s strategy
p∗1 ∈ P is an N.E if it satisfies:
∀k ∈ K and ∀pk ∈ PK , uk(p
∗
k, p
∗
−k) ≥ uk(pk, p
∗
−k) (1.12)
That is, at the NE, any unilateral deviation from the strategy profile pk of player k,
∀k ∈ K will not increase its utility function. Hence, at the NE there does not exist any
motivation for a player to deviate from the NE strategy profile. As players are selfish and
decide by themselves their strategy, one question arises: does an NE lead to an efficient game
outcome? The NE is generally inefficient and non-optimal, however it is a lower bound in
the case of non-cooperation between players.
Definition 3 (Satisfaction Equilibrium) An action profile p+ is a satisfaction equilib-
rium for the game G′ =
(
K, {Pk}k∈K, {fk}k∈K
)
if
∀k ∈ K, p+k ∈ f−k
(
p+k
)
. (1.13)
Definition 4 (Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium) Define a function ck : Pk → [0, 1] for
all k ∈ K and consider the game G′. For all (k, p∗k, p
′
k) ∈ K × P
2
k , the action p
′
k is said to be
more costly that action p∗k if ck (p
′
k) > ck (pk). An action profile p
∗ ∈ P is an ESE if and
1.3. GAME THEORY AND SELF-ORGANIZED FEMTOCELL NETWORKS 11
only if:
∀k ∈ K, p∗k ∈ arg min
pk∈fk(p∗−k)
ck (pk) . (1.14)
Then, p∗ is one of the efficient SE (ESE) of the game G′.
Definition 5 (Logit Equilibrium): Consider the Markov game G = {G(h(t))}t>0. The
mixed strategy profile pi∗ = (pi∗1, ...,pi
∗
L) ∈ △ (A1) ,× . . . ,×△ (AK) is a logit equilibrium, if
∀k ∈ K,
pi∗k = βk
(
uˆk
(
pi∗−k
))
, (1.15)
where theNk dimensional vector uˆk (pi−k) =
(
uˆ
k,q
(0,0)
k
(pi−k) , uˆk,q(1,1)
k
(pi−k) , . . . , uˆk,q(Lk,N)
k
(pi−k)
)
is the expected interference minimization metric, i.e., for all k ∈ K and for all (ℓk, nk) ∈
{1, . . . , Lk} × N ∪ {(0, 0)}),
u
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(pi−k)=E
∑
p−k∈P−k
(∏
j∈K\{k} π
∗
j,pj
)
u(h,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
,p−k)h.
and:
βk(uˆk) =
exp
(
1
κk
uˆk
)
∑
(i,j)∈N×L exp
(
1
κk
uˆk
) (1.16)
Where ∀k ∈ K and ∀(s, l) ∈ N × L, βk(uˆk) > 0 regardless of the estimation vector uˆk.
Definition 6 (Best-Response Correspondence) In a non-cooperative game described
by the 3-tuple
(
K, (Pk)∀k∈K , (uk)∀k∈K
)
, the relation BRk : P−k → Pk such that
BRk(p−k)=argmaxqk∈Pk uk(qk,p−k), (1.17)
is defined as the best-response correspondence of player k ∈ K, given the actions p−k adopted
by all the other players.
Definition 7 (Best Response Dynamics) Let the action profile p(t) = (p1(t), . . . ,pK(t))
be the result of a best-response dynamics at time t. Then, for all k ∈ K, and for all t ∈ N
and t > 0, the vector pk(t) can be obtained as follows: (1) In the sequential best-response
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dynamics (round-Robin order):
pk(t)∈BRk(p1(t),...,pk−1(t),pk+1(t−1),...,pK(t−1)), (1.18)
(2) in the simultaneous best-response dynamics:
pk(t) ∈ BRk
(
p−k(t− 1)
)
, (1.19)
where p(0) can be any vector p ∈ P.
1.4 Learning mechanisms for femtocell networks
Two mechanisms for interference mitigation, inspired by evolutionary game theory and
reinforcement-based learning [21] to support the coexistence of a macrocell network and
underlaid self-organized femtocells are herein compared in terms of achievable performances
as well as needed signalling. In both approaches, femto base stations rely on the measure-
ments fed back by their user equipments in order to update their strategy until an eventual
convergence.
1.4.1 Evolutionary-based approach
The first interference mitigation mechanism is based on the concept of evolutionary game
theory, where each FBS chooses its strategy against other FBSs located within the same
network. FBSs observe the behavior of other competitors, learn from the observations, and
make the best decision based on their instantaneous payoff, as well as the average payoff of
all other femtocells. The game theoretic model G(ev) =
(
K, (Ak)k∈K , (uk)k∈K
)
is formulated
as follows:
• K = {1, ..., K} is the set of players (i.e., femtocell base stations),
• Atk = {a
k,s
t }k∈K where a
k,n
t is the action of FBS k at time t is to transmit over a carrier
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n.
• Rtk =
∑
n log2
(
1+SINR
)
is the reward of FBS k transmitting in sub-carrier n at time
t. Moreover, the average payoff of the entire population is defined as: R¯tk =
∑
k R
t
k
K
.
In the aforementioned mechanism, an entity which is referred to as HNB-Gateway [25] col-
lects the payoffs for all femtocells and calculates the average rate of the entire femtocell
network. The payoff Rtk of FBS k is then compared with the average payoffs R¯
t
k and in the
case when it is less that the average rate of the femtocell network, a random strategy is
chosen and the whole process is repeated again.
1.4.2 Q-learning based approach
The Q-learning model consists of a set of states n ∈ N and actions a ∈ A aiming at finding
a policy that maximizes the observed rewards over the interaction time of the agents/players
(i.e., femtocells). Every FBS k ∈ K explores its environment, observes its current state s,
and takes a subsequent action a, according to a decision policy π : s→ a. With their ability
to learn, the knowledge about other players’ strategies is not explicitly needed by FBS k.
Instead, a Q-function maintains the knowledge about other players in the network locally,
based on which decisions are made. Several authors have shown that Q-learning converges
to optimal values in Markov decision process environment. Thus, the goal of the agent is to
find an optimal policy π∗(s) for each state s, which maximizes a cumulative measure of the
rewards over time.
The expected discounted reward over an infinite horizon is given by:
V π(s) = E
{
γt × r(st, π
∗(st))|s0 = s
}
, (1.20)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a discount factor and r is the agent’s reward at time t. Furthermore,
14CHAPTER 1. GAME THEORY AND FEMTOCELL COMMUNICATIONS: MAKING NETWORK
Equation (1.20) can be rewritten as:
V π(s) = R(s, π∗(s)) + γ
∑
v∈S
Ps,v(π(s))V
π(v), (1.21)
where R(s, π∗(s)) = E{r(s, π(s))} is the mean value of reward r(s, π(s)), and Ps,v is the tran-
sition probability from state s to v. Moreover, the optimal policy π∗ satisfies the optimality
criterion:
V ∗(s) = V π
∗
(s) = max
a∈A
(
R(s, a) + γ
∑
v∈N
Ps,v(a)V
∗(v)
)
, (1.22)
It is generally difficult to explicitly calculate the reward R(s, a) and transition probability
Ps,v(a). However, through Q-learning, the knowledge of these values can be gradually learnt
and reinforced with time. For a given policy π, define a Q-value as:
Q∗(s, a) = R(s, a) + γ
∑
v∈S
Ps,v(a)V
π(v), (1.23)
which is the expected discounted reward when executing action a at state s and then following
policy π thereafter.
We make use of the Q-learning algorithm to iteratively approximate the state-action
value function Q(s, a). Here, the FBS keeps trying all actions in all states with non-zero
probability and must sometimes explore by choosing at each step a random action with
probability β ∈ (0, 1). Alternatively, FBSs can make use of the Boltzmann exploration
strategy with the temperature parameter κ, where the action a in state s is taken with a
probability P (a|s), and the femtocell receives a reinforcement r. The actions are chosen
according to their Q-values as:
p(a|s) =
eQ(s
i,a)/κ∑
a′ 6=a e
Q(si,a′)/κ
. (1.24)
The game is defined as follows: G(rl) =
(
K, (Pk)k∈K , (uk)k∈K
)
where
• K = {1, ..., K} is the set of players (i.e., femtocell base stations),
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• Stk = {s
k,n
t }k∈K where s
k,n
t ∈ {0, 1}. The state of every FBS k at time t in sub-carrier n
indicates whether FBS k generates interference towards MUE and the QoS of MUE is
violated, (i.e., C0 < Γ0).
• Atk = {a
k,n
t }k∈K where a
k,n
t is the action of FBS k at time t is to transmit over a set of
sub-carrier C ∈ {1, ..., Nsub}.
• Rtk = 1{Γ0−C0}
∑
n∈C log(1+SINR) is the reward of FBS k transmitting in the set C at
time t.
In the Q-learning process, in which FBS k performs the exploration step with probability
β. A new Q-value, i.e., Q(St+1k , A
t+1
k ), which is the expected payoff for the future iterations,
is obtained based on previous value, i.e., Q(Stk, A
t
k), along with the new observed payoff
Rkt+1(S
k
t+1). Moreover, the Q-learning is updated as follows:
Q(Stk, A
t
k) = (1− α)Q(S
t
k, A
t
k) + α
[
Rkt+1(S
k
t+1) + γmax
Bt+1
k
Q(St+1k , B
t+1
k )
]
(1.25)
where α is the players’ willingness to learn from its environment and γ is the discount factor.
1.5 QoS provisioning for femtocell network
The focus is on a fully decentralized approach for solving interference mitigation from the
FBS to the macrocell user equipments (MUEs). The underlying assumption is that MUEs
feed back messages to their corresponding macrocell BS containing their instantaneous SINR
(decoded by all FBSs). The repetitive observation of the SINR is used by the FBS to
dynamically configure their frequency band and power levels such that a minimum time-
average SINR can be guaranteed at the macrocells. We make use of recent results in game
theory and stochastic approximation applied to the problem of femto-to-macrocell cross-tier
interference.
The interference minimization problem is modeled by a stochastic game made of a se-
quence of strategic games played at different states, e.g., channel realizations. Let us de-
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note by G(h(t)) = (K, {Ak}k∈K, {φ}k∈K) the static strategic game and let us denote by
G = {G(h(t))}t>0 the stochastic game where at each time t, the game G(h(t)) is played,
with t ∈ {1, . . . ,∞}. In order to define the stochastic game, a short and long-term formula-
tion is given:
Let us describe the network during the interval from t − 1 to t by the game G(h(t)) =
(K, {Ak}k∈K, {u}k∈K). Here, K represents the set of FBS in the network. For all k ∈ K, the
set of actions of FBS k is the set of PA vectors, i.e., Ak = {q
(ℓ,n)
k : ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , Lk}, and n ∈
N}. Finally, u : H×A1×AK → R+ is the payoff or interference minimization metric of all
femtocells.
At each time t > 0 and for all k ∈ K, FBS k chooses its action from the finite set Ak
following a probability distribution pik(t) =
(
π
k,q
(1,1)
k
(t), ..., π
k,q
(Lk,Nk)
k
(t)
)
where π
k,q
(lk,nk)
k
is
the probability that femtocell k plays action q
(lk,nk)
k at time t, i.e.,
π
k,q
(lk,nk)
k
= Pr
(
pk(t) = q
(lk ,nk)
k
)
. (1.26)
where (lk, nk) ∈ {1, ..., LK} × S ∪ {(0, 0)} In the following, we describe the long-term game
G, and we introduce the method which each FBS uses to choose the probability distribution
pik(t), at each time t.
Long-Term Formulation
The long-term behaviour of the network is modeled by the succession of static strategic games
G = {G (h(t))}t>0. This succession produces a Markov game G = {G(h(t))}t>0, where at
each stage t the game G(h(t)) is played assuming that the network is described by the vector
h(t). According to the system model, the actual state of the network h(t) follows a Markov
chain with transitions following the rule, ∀ (h′,h′′) ∈ H2, Pr (h(t) = h′ |h(t− 1) = h′′ ) =
Pr (h(t) = h′) = πh′. Here, πh′ , for all h
′ ∈ H, are parameters obtained from previous
channel modeling studies. Note that transitions between states are independent of the actions
of the transmitters. The game G = {G(h(t))}t>0 proceeds in infinitely many stages. At each
stage t ∈ {0, . . . ,∞}, FBSs choose their corresponding actions p1(t), . . . ,pK(t). When doing
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so, each FBS k observes a noisy sample u˜k(t) of the corresponding instantaneous interference
minimization metric u(h(t),pk(t),p−k(t)), i.e.,
u˜k(t) = u(h(t),pk(t),p−k(t)) + εk,pk(t)(t), (1.27)
where, ∀(ℓk, nk) ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} × S ∪ {(0, 0)}, and ∀k ∈ K, εk,q(ℓk,nk)
k
(t) is the realization at
time t of a random variable ε
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
which represents the additive noise on the observation
of the instantaneous performance u(t) when FBS k plays action q
(ℓk ,nk)
k . Here, we assume
that Eε
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
= 0.
Our behavioral assumption is that all FBS are interested on choosing the probability
distribution pik(t) ∈ △ (Ak) to optimize the time-average interference minimization metric
at each time t > 0, i.e., u¯k(t), which is calculated empirically based on the observations u˜k(t)
as follows,
u¯k(t) =
1
t
t∑
n=1
u˜k(n). (1.28)
To choose the optimal probability distribution pik(t), the FBS relies on estimations of the
time-average interference minimization metric obtained with each of its actions. For all
(ℓk, nk) ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} × S ∪ {(0, 0)}, let uˆk,q(ℓk,nk)
k
(t), be the estimation of time-average
interference minimization metric obtained by playing action q
(ℓk ,nk)
k . This estimation is
calculated as follows,
uˆ
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(n) = 1
T
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t)
∑t
n=1 u˜k(n)1
{
pk(n)=q
(ℓk,nk)
k
}, (1.29)
where, T
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t) =
∑t
n=1 1
{
pk(n)=q
(ℓk,nk)
k
}. Once the Nk-dimensional vector of estimations
of FBS k is obtained, i.e., uˆk =
(
uˆ
k,q
(0,0)
k
, uˆ
k,q
(1,1)
k
, . . . , uˆ
k,q
(Lk,S)
k
)
for all k ∈ K, it is used
to determine the optimal probability distribution pik(t) =
(
π
k,q
(0,0)
k
, π
k,q
(1,1)
k
, . . . , π
k,q
(Lk,S)
k
)
at each time t. For doing so, we define the function βk : R
Nk → △ (A). Note that the
probability distribution βk (uˆk(t)) must take into consideration that, FBSs must experiment
between different actions such that the estimation vector uˆk(t) is improved at each time t,
but also FBSs must optimize their respective interference minimization metric.
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1.5.1 Exploration vs. Performance Optimization
Femtocells face a trade-off between optimizing their time-average utility by taking the action
that does it at each time t, and trying out different actions so as to improve the estimation of
the time-average interference mitigation metric obtained with each action. This implies that
a reasonable behavioral rule would be to choose the actions which yield high payoffs more
likely than actions yielding low payoffs, but in any case, always letting a non-null probability
of playing any of the actions. Following the results in [20], the behavioral rule described
above can be modeled by the probability distribution βk(uˆk(t)) satisfying:
βk(uˆk(t)) ∈ argmaxpik∈△(Ak)
[∑
pk∈Ak
πk,pk uˆk,pk(t) + κkH(pik)
]
(1.30)
where H represents the Shannon entropy function. For all k ∈ K, the parameter κk > 0
represents the interest of FBS k to choose other actions rather than the optimal one in order
to improve the time-average interference minimization metric. The unique solution to the
right hand side of the optimization problem in (1.30) is written as (1.16):
βk(uˆk(t))=
(
β
k,q
(0,0)
k
(uˆk(t)),β
k,q
(1,1)
k
(uˆk(t)),...,β
k,q
(Lk,S)
k
(uˆk(t))
)
, (1.31)
In order to achieve the LE of game G = {G(h(t))}t>0. Assume that the estimation
of the time-average interference minimization metric and the mixed strategy of FBS k are
calculated as follows, ∀k ∈ K and ∀(ℓk, nk) ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} × N ∪ {(0, 0)},
uˆ
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t) = uˆ
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t−1)+
α(t)
1{
pk(t)=q
(ℓk,nk)
k
}
π
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t)
(
u˜(t)−uˆ
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t−1)
)
,
π
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t) = π
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t−1)+
λ(t)
(
β
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(uˆk(t))−π
k,q
(ℓk,nk)
k
(t−1)
)
,
(1.32)
where, uˆk(0) ∈ RNk and pik(0) ∈ △ (Ak) are arbitrary initializations and λ and α are learning
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rates chosen such that
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
α(t) + λ(t) = +∞ (1.33)
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
α(t)2 + λ(t)2 < +∞, and, (1.34)
lim
t→∞
λ(t)
α(t)
= 0. (1.35)
Then, both learning processes (1.32) converge for all k ∈ K. Additionally, and it holds that,
lim
t→∞
pik(t) = pi
∗
k, (1.36)
lim
t→∞
uˆ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t) = uk(pi
∗
−k), (1.37)
where pi∗ = (pi∗1, . . . ,pi
∗
K) is a LE of the game G = {G(h(t))}t>0.
1.6 Spectral Efficiency in Femtocell Networks
Spectral efficiency in femtocell networks is instrumental for the successful deployment of
femtocells. Here, Femtocells access the spectrum in a parallel multiple access mode. Two
particular deployment scenarios are hereafter studied: (a) FBSs strategically split their
transmit power between the available channels, and (b) FBSs use only one channel at a
time. In both cases, FBSs maximize their individual spectral efficiency. Problems (a) and
(b), which respectively correspond to a decentralized power allocation and channel selection
problem, are modeled by strategic form games.
1.6.1 Power Allocation Problems
The PA game G(a) models the scenario where FBSs allocate any power level to any of their
own channels subject to the power constraints given in (1.6)
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It is proved in [24] that the game G(a) is an exact potential game, and hence at least one
NE in pure strategies exists. Similarly, at least one NE in mixed strategies exist because the
action spaces, P(a)k for all k ∈ K are convex and compact in their respective finite dimensional
spaces, and the utility is jointly continuous [43]. Furthermore, the game G(a) is shown to
have a unique NE strategy profile in pure strategies, p† ∈ P(a) with probability one, solution
of the following optimization problem:
p† ∈ arg max
p∈P(a)
φ (p) . (1.38)
The components of the vector p† in (1.38) are for all (k, s) ∈ K ×N ,
(p
(n)
k )
† =
BnB 1βk −
σ2n +
∑
j∈K\{k}
(p
(n)
j )
†g
(n)
j
g
(n)
k

+
, (1.39)
where, βk is a Lagrangian multiplier chosen to saturate the power constraints (1.16).
Assuming that each transmitter knows its actual channel gains gk =
(
g
(1)
k , . . . , g
(N)
k
)
,
the bandwidth of all channels b = (B1, . . . , BN), and its own actual PA vector pk, each
transmitter can determine its best response (1.19) based on a common message from the
receiver, and hence obtain the unique outcome of the game using the best response dynamics
(BRD) in which the sequential best response dynamics of any potential game converges to
an NE [36].
It is worth noting that the sequential BRD in the game G(a) lead to the same result as the
iterative water-filling algorithm (IWFA) presented in [33] but under a different setting. One
of the main drawbacks of the iterative BRD (and IWFA) is its large time for convergence
as well as its required signaling (message κ(t)). To overcome this problem, other algorithms
such as the simultaneous water-filling algorithm (SWFA), which follows the simultaneous
best-response dynamics (Def. 7) was proposed [34].
Different information drive different convergence behaviors. In terms of convergence, the
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IWFA (iterative BRD) always converges. The SWFA (simultaneous BRD), at least on the
interference channel, converges to an NE depending on the channel realizations and the
number of active transmitters [34]. In the interference channel PA game in [34], when the
SWFA converges, hence it converges faster than the IWFA. Finally, the IWFA requires a
(broadcast) signaling message (the multiple access interference over each channel) every time
that a given transmitter updates its PA vector. Conversely, SWFA requires one message after
all transmitters have updated their PA vector.
1.6.2 Channel Selection Problems
Here, a constraint is imposed onto the femtocells, in which they can only transmit over one
channel at a time. It is ready to check that every femto BS has to saturate its transmit power
to maximize its utility. Indeed, ∀k ∈ K and ∀p−k ∈ P
(b)
−k, φ
(
pk en,p−k
)
< φ
(
pk,max es,p−k
)
where en =
(
e
(1)
n , . . . , e
(N)
n
)
∈ RN , ∀r ∈ N \ n, e(r)n = 0, and e
(n)
n = 1. The problem
under investigation is therefore a channel selection problem. Technically, the main difference
between G(a) and G(b) is that the latter is a finite game (|K×N | < +∞). As a consequence,
the number of pure NE is generally more than 1.
The game G(b) is an exact potential game (Prop. 1) and thus, following Lemma 2.3 in
[38], the game G(b) has always at least one NE in pure as well as mixed strategies. To identify
an upper-bound of the number of NE, basic tools from graph theory in which L ∈ N multiple
pure NE strategy profiles exist, and 1 6 L 6 SK−1.
Assuming that the game is played repeatedly, one can exploit Prop. ?? to state that BRD
converges to an NE. The best response of transmitter k ∈ K in the game G(b) is
BRk
(
p−k
)
= {pk ∈ Pk : pk = pk,maxen∗k and n
∗
k = (1.40)
argmax
n∈N
BN
B
log2
(
1+
pk,maxgk,n
σ2n+
∑
j∈K\{k} pj,maxgj,n
)
},
and can be determined locally by each transmitter using the feedback message, the knowledge
of its own channel realizations and the bandwidth of each channel.
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Besides the BRD (iterative and sequential, Def. 7), when the set of actions is discrete,
other dynamics such as fictitious play [42], reinforcement learning (RL) [36], among some
others, converge to equilibrium in the game G(b), and more importantly, the information
assumptions can be significantly relaxed [41].
Let us denote by pk(t) ∈ P
(b)
k and h(t) ∈ H the action taken by player k and the
vector of channel realizations at time t. Hence, for all k ∈ K, uk : H × P(b) → R, and
uk
(
h(t),pk(t),p−k(t)
)
represents the instantaneous utility obtained by player k at time t.
For the ease of notation, we use the equality uk(t) = uk
(
h(t),pk(t),p−k(t)
)
. At each time
t, each player k ∈ K chooses its action pk(t) following a probability distribution pik(t) =(
π
k,p
(1)
k
(t), . . . , π
k,p
(N)
k
(t)
)
, where ∀k ∈ K and ∀pk ∈ P
(b)
k , πk,pk(t) represents the probability
that player k plays action pk ∈ P
(b)
k at time t, i.e., πk,pk(t) = Pr (pk(t) = pk). In the fictitious
play (FP) [42], player k ∈ K must observe the actions of all the other players at each time t
and be able to calculate the empirical probability distributions πj(t), for all j ∈ K \ {k}. At
each time t, the action of player k is:
pk(t) ∈ arg max
pk∈P
(b)
k
Epi−kuk(pk,p−k). (1.41)
In the reinforcement learning (RL), e.g. replicator dynamics [37], transmitters k ∈ K observes
a numerical sample u˜k(t) of its obtained utility at each time t and its set of actions P
(b)
k are
supposed to be known. At each time t, transmitter k chooses its PA vector following the
probability distribution pik(t), which is updated based on u˜k(t), as follows,
π
k,p
(n)
k
(t) = π
k,p
(n)
k
(t−1) (1.42)
+λk(t)u˜k(t)
(
1
{pk(t)=p
(n)
k
}
−π
k,p
(n)
k
(t−1)
)
,
where λk(t) is such that 0 6 λk(t)u˜k(t) 6 1, for all k ∈ K and t > 0.
The FP converges (at least in probability) to NE in potential games [39]. On the contrary,
the convergence of the RL is conditioned on the initial strategies of the dynamics pik(0), for all
k ∈ K [37]. Moreover, in the FP, players must be able to solve at each time t, the optimization
problem (1.41). Hence, the computational capabilities depend on the complexity of the
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utility function. Conversely, in RL only arithmetic operations are required, since the utility
is assumed to be observed at each time t. Besides, In the FP players are supposed to know
the structure of the game and observe the actions of all the other players. In RL, players
know only their own actions and are able to observe a numerical value of the obtained utility.
Finally, in the FP players are assumed to be myopically rational, i.e., players take the action
which maximizes their instant utility. In contrast, the rationality assumption is not required
in the RL case. Here, players take randomly (subject to a probability distribution) an action
which might or not maximize its own utility. Note that unlike RL, FP is too demanding in
terms of information assumptions.
1.7 Conclusions and open issues
In this chapter, we have looked at the strategic interaction between the macrocell and un-
derlaid femtocells from a game theoretic perspective. Different game theoretic formulations
were investigated along with different information assumption. It turns out that game the-
ory along with learning theory are two key enabling frameworks for the analysis and design
of femtocell networks. Yet, more work is needed for addressing the strategic interaction of
femtocells such as in the case of hierarchy and cooperation among femtocells.
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